We find evidence of "local bias" in the acquisition decisions of U.S public firms. Over the period [1990][1991][1992][1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003] 18.8% transactions were local, where the acquirer and the target are within 100 kms of each other. The expected probability that a target would be acquired by a public firm that operates in the same industry and is located within 100 kms is, however, only 6.2 percent. Further, acquirer returns in local transaction are a significant 56% higher than that in non-local transactions. Our results also suggest that, information, rather than synergies, is more likely to be behind the superior performance of local acquirers. We add a new dimension -geography -to explain cross-sectional variation in acquirer returns.
1 Though the effect of geography on the original location decision of firms has been widely studied, we know little about its effect on the subsequent investment decisions of firms. In this paper, we examine whether geography is an important determinant of acquisitions made by publicly traded firms in the US. Also, we examine whether geographical proximity increases the value created by these acquisitions.
Of a sample of all mergers and acquisitions of majority interest and assets by public firms between 1990 and 2003, we find that 18.8 percent were categorized as "local" or geographically proximate. As in prior studies (see, for example, Coval and Moskowitz (2001)), we define transactions as "local" if they are between firms located within 100 kms of each other. In contrast, the expected probability of a target (or its assets) being acquired by a public firm, in the same industry, that is located within 100 kms is only 6.2 percent. Even if we consider all public firms that operate in the same industry as either the target or the actual acquirer, the expected probability of a local transaction is only 8.5 percent, much lower than the actual proportion of 18.8 percent.
Further, we find that acquirers earn a significantly higher return when they acquire "local" targets as compared to "non-local" targets. The average 5-day cumulative abnormal return, over [-2, 2] days around announcement, is 2.76 percent for local transactions as compared to 1.77 percent for non-local transactions. This difference is not only statistically significant but also economically significant. The increase in acquiring firm's shareholder value created by local transactions is 56% greater than the increase for non-local transactions.
A similar "local" bias has been documented in the investment decisions of mutual funds (Coval and Moskowitz (1999,2001) ) and in the portfolios of retail investors (See Huberman (2001) and Ivkovich and Weisbennar (2003) ). These studies also document a higher return to local investments relative to non-local investments in the portfolio and attribute the superior performance of local investments to informational advantage. An acquisition of another firm or an acquisition of assets of another firm can be viewed simply as an addition to the existing portfolio of projects for the acquiring firm. However, unlike investors who trade local stocks mostly for information reasons, firms may prefer to transact with local firms to exploit synergies as well. Synergies are likely to be higher when firms are closer to each other than when they are separated by large distances. We investigate the relative contribution of synergies and information advantages to the higher acquirer return documented in local transactions.
As industries tend to be geographically concentrated (for example, Hollywood and Silicon valley), local acquisitions could proxy for same industry transactions, and their higher return evidence of the higher synergies in these deals. However, we do not find that local acquisitions are predominantly within the same industry. Approximately, 18.2 percent of all deals in the same industry are local as compared to 18.9 percent when acquirers and targets are in different industries. Moreover, acquirer return in local acquisitions within the same industry (0.67%) is less than half of the acquirer return in local acquisitions across industries (1.44%).
This suggests that the higher local acquirer return is unlikely to be due to potentially higher synergies associated with same industry transactions. However, there might be other operational synergies associated with local transactions.
If local transactions are associated with higher synergies, then total returns should be higher in local acquisitions (see Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) and Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) ). As the higher returns arise only when acquirers are local, local acquirers are likely to capture most of the synergistic gains with target returns being the same or somewhat higher. In contrast, as information asymmetry may prevent all potential buyers from bidding it is likely to be associated with lower total returns and lower target returns. In a subset of our sample where the targets are public, we examine target returns and total returns in local transactions to examine whether local transactions are associated with higher synergies or information advantages. We find no evidence that target returns or total returns are higher in local transactions suggesting that local synergies are unlikely to account for the higher local acquirer return.
For asset markets to be competitive, all bidders and buyers of assets must be equally informed about the asset. With information asymmetries, uninformed potential buyers may not bid for the asset. In the absence of competitive bidding, the price at which the asset is sold will not on average capture the gains from employing the asset in its most productive use.
Consequently, informed buyers of assets will earn positive returns from the purchase. If geographic proximity is associated with information advantages, acquirers in local transactions should earn higher returns in their acquisitions. Such an advantage could easily arise if information travels slowly in spatially constrained social networks, as suggested in several studies in economics and social science. (See, for example, Baum and Sorenson (2003) .)
Using several proxies to capture the information asymmetry faced by target, we find that the return to local acquirers is decreasing in the information availability of the target. Local acquirer return is higher when the target is private than when it is public, indicating that physical proximity helps mitigate non-availability of other public sources of information. We also find that local acquirers have higher returns when the mode of payment involves some stock relative to cash only acquisitions. As stock is more likely to be used when there is uncertainty about target value (see Hansen (1987) and Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990) ), the results suggest the role of geographic proximity in transactions with target uncertainty. Lastly, we use geographic location to capture information availability of the target. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) , Malloy (2003) , and Lougran and Schulz (2004) find that firms headquartered in nonmetro areas face information problems relative to metro firms. We find local acquirer return to be higher when the target is located in a non-metro area than when it is in a metro area.
Aside of information and synergies, previous studies have identified agency costs as a possible motive behind acquisitions. Acquisitions motivated by agency costs do not earn positive returns in general (See Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) ). Firms with high agency costs are less likely to engage in acquisitions to exploit information advantages or synergies associated with physical proximity. This would suggest that there should be little difference between local and non-local acquisitions of high agency cost acquirers.
We use three proxies to capture agency costs in acquirers. Firstly, we estimate free cash flow for acquirers in the year prior to the acquisition. Firms with free cash are more likely to engage in value destroying acquisitions (See Jensen (1986) , Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) ).
Secondly, firms that undertake many acquisitions are less likely to be motivated by economic gains. Lastly, large firms are more likely to undertake acquisitions that destroy value (See Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003) ). We find little difference in returns of local and nonlocal acquisitions when acquirers have high agency costs as captured by all three proxies. On the other hand, low agency costs acquirers earn significantly higher returns in their local transactions.
In summary, we find a "local bias" in the acquisition decisions of firms that seem to be motivated more by informational advantages than by synergies arising from geographical proximity. These information advantages might arise from social networks with owners and employees of private targets, or from direct and indirect business interactions with target firms.
Presence of information asymmetries implies that some potential acquirers, facing information disadvantages, may not bid for the assets of the target firm. This might potentially have significant implications for efficient allocation of assets in the economy.
The results provide a new dimension to explain cross-sectional variation in bidder returns. Several decades of research on merger activity (for surveys see Jensen and Ruback (1983 ), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988 ), and Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001 ) find that acquirers earn, on average, a zero return in their acquisitions of public firms. However, more recently, Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) , and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003) document that average return to acquirers is significantly positive when the targets are not publicly traded and for small acquirers respectively. We show that, conditional on the target status and the size of the acquirer, local acquisitions earn significantly higher returns than nonlocal acquisitions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related literature, section III discusses the data, section IV examines acquirer returns, section V relates acquirer returns to proxies for information asymmetry, local synergies and agency costs and finally section VI concludes.
II. Related Literature
There is an increasing and diverse literature examining the impact of geography and physical distance. As mentioned before, Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001 ) document "local bias" in mutual fund investments and show that these local investments earn higher returns. Huberman (2001) , Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) , Zhu (2002) and Ivkovich and Weisbennar (2003) show a similar local bias in portfolios of individual investors. Petersen and Rajan (2002) examine the effect of distance on commercial bank lending. Malloy (2003) and Orpurt (2004) find that analysts are more accurate in their earnings forecasts of local firms. Loughran and Schultz (2004) argue that information is first incorporated in the stock prices of firms located in metro areas. Pirinsky and Wang (2004) find evidence of co-movement in the returns of firms headquartered in the same geographic area. Kedia (2004) examines the effect of geographic proximity on the incidence of financial misreporting.
The importance of geographic proximity has also been documented outside the context of financial decision making. Audretsch and Feldman (1996) document the role of physical distance in R&D spillovers and innovative activity. Audretsch and Stephan (1996) document the importance of local scientists for biotechnology firms. Sah (1991) and Glaeser, Sarcedote and Scheinkmen (1996) discuss the importance of physical proximity in influencing the perceived cost of criminal activities and consequently crime adoption rates.
The paper also draws upon and contributes to the vast literature on merger activity (For surveys see Jensen and Ruback (1983 ), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988 ), and Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001 . A common finding across these studies is that mergers create value, with bidders making on average zero returns and most of the gains accruing to target companies. In recent work Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003) document that bidder returns are positive when the targets are non-public firms. Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) suggest that these higher returns are due to a liquidity discount associated with private targets. We find that some of the higher returns to acquirers, when targets are private, are associated with information disadvantages of the target firms. Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) find that in the acquisition of Canadian targets the returns to Canadian acquirers are on average positive while those to US acquirers are on average zero. They find that product market relationships, or foreign investment controls do not explain the higher return to Canadian acquirers. Evidence in this paper suggests that information advantages arising from geographic or cultural proximity might explain the higher return to Canadian acquirers.
The finding of on average zero returns to bidding firms is consistent with a competitive acquisition market (See Mandelker (1974) , Asquith (1983) and Ruback (1983) ).
2 In contrast to mergers and acquisitions of majority interest, the evidence on the competitiveness of markets in asset sales is weak. Jain (1985) finds significant positive gains to acquirers of assets and little 2 Other explanations for the on average zero bidder returns have been examined. Song and Walkling (2004) show that zero bidder returns are due to the market anticipating the acquisition programs of firms. Bhagat, Dong, Hirchleifer and Noah (2004) argue that the announcement period returns do not take into account the probability of the bid failing and also incorporate information about the stand alone value of the bidder.
evidence of multiple bids in the sale of assets. Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995) find that assets are sold by poor performing firms for financing rather than for efficient redeployment of assets. Pulvino (1998) shows that sale of assets by financially distressed firms takes place at prices well below the fundamental value of the asset. Absence of information asymmetries is necessary to ensure that all potential bidders emerge, and crucial to ensuring competitive acquisition markets.
By documenting the presence of information asymmetries, our paper is related to this literature.
III. Data
The were private firms, in 18% they were public firms and in the remaining they were subsidiaries.
The mean value of the transaction is $297 million while the median is much smaller at $23 million (Table 2 ). Not surprisingly, the mean value of the transaction is much higher for mergers and acquisition of majority interest ($562 million) in comparison to acquisition of assets ($83 million). Also not surprisingly, the mean value of transactions with public targets is substantially higher ($1243 million) in comparison to private targets ($59 million) or subsidiaries ($160 million).
The mean relative value of the transaction, measured as the ratio of the value of the transaction to the market value of the acquirer in the year prior to the announcement of the transaction, is 0.29. The median is much lower at 0.09. The mean market value of acquirers of private targets is $3.8 billion in comparison to $10.9 billion for acquirers of public targets.
Smaller firms are more likely to acquire private firms or assets from private firms.
About 60% of the transactions are in the same two-digit SIC as reported by SDC. There is no difference in the percentage of same industry transactions by type of transaction or by the organization form of the target. We group method of payment into three categories (See Martin (1996) and Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) 
Estimation of Distance between Acquirer and Target
SDC reports the city and state for all acquirer and target firms. We match this data with data from the U S Census Bureau Gazetteer to get latitudes and longitudes for each acquirer and target. We then use the arc length between these two coordinates to estimate the distance between the acquirer and the target. The distance d between place 1 and 2 was estimated using the Haversine formula. With R the radius of the earth ( 6378 kilometers) the distance is
In the above expression and . Lat1 and lon1 are the latitude and longitude of place 1 (acquirer's location) and lat2 and lon2 are the latitude and longitude of place 2 (target location).
A transaction was classified as a local transaction if the distance between acquirer and target was less than 100km (See Coval and Moskowitz (2001) , Malloy (2002) ). Approximately, 18.8% of all transactions were categorized as local. Public firms and potential acquirers are not distributed uniformly across the country. Consequently, the probability of a transaction being local varies substantially. Firms located in areas with several public firm headquarters have a higher likelihood of being acquired locally. We use several assumptions to estimate the expected probability of being acquired locally. Firstly, we assume that all public firms could be potential acquirers. For every transaction, we estimate the fraction of all public firms that are headquartered within a 100km radius of the target firm in the year prior to the announcement of the transaction. Data on company headquarters is obtained from Compustat. An average target firm has only 6.9% of all public firms residing locally, i.e., the expected probability of being acquired locally is 6.9%. This is in contrast to the 18.8% realized probability of being acquired locally. This "local bias" is seen for all quintiles ranked by the fraction of public firms headquartered locally (See Table 3 , Panel A).
Secondly, we assume that only public firms in the same two-digit SIC as the target firm are potential acquirers. An average target firm has only 6.2% of its industry located within 100km (Panel B, Table 3 ). Lastly, we extend the set of potential acquirers to also include all public firms in the two-digit SIC of the actual acquirer. The expected probability of being acquired locally is now estimated to be 8.5% (Panel C, Table 3 ). Under all three assumptions, the expected probability of being acquired locally is well below the 18.8% local deals observed in the data.
IV. Acquirer Returns
In this section, we examine the relation between acquirer returns and local transactions.
Acquirer returns are estimated using Brown and Warner's (1985) methodology to calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the five-day period (-2,2) around the announcement of the transaction. The abnormal returns are given as where is the daily return on firm i and is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index. We do not estimate market parameters as acquirers could complete multiple transactions over the year (See Fuller, Netter and
Stegemoller (2002)).
The average return to acquirers in local transactions was 2.76% ( See Table 4 ). This is higher than the 1.77% return to acquirers in non-local transactions. This difference of 99 basis points between returns to acquirers in local versus non-local deals is significant at the 1% level.
This difference between local and non-local returns is economically significant as well.
Acquirers earn 56% more in local transactions relative to non-local transactions. The returns to acquirers in local transactions are somewhat higher for asset acquisitions relative to mergers and acquisition of majority interest. Acquirers earn 114 basis points more in local relative to nonlocal asset acquisitions. In comparison, they earn 92 basis points more in local mergers and acquisition of majority interest. There are significant differences in acquirer returns for local and non-local deals by the status of the target. Local acquirers returns are highest when the target is a private firm. They earn 114 basis points more in these transactions. Acquirers also earn significantly higher returns of 122 basis points in local transactions that involve subsidiaries.
When targets are public, average acquirer returns are negative for both local and non-local transactions consistent with the results in prior literature. Though acquirer returns in local transactions are higher (less negative), the difference is not statistically significant.
4.1What is Local and Non-Local?
Consistent with prior literature (See Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001 ) and Malloy (2002)) we define local transactions as those where the acquirer and target firms reside within 100km of each other. However, there is no theoretical motivation for using 100km to define local transactions. In this section, we examine the effect of distance on the distribution of transactions and acquirer returns.
About 7.3% of all transactions occur when target and acquirer firms have zero distance i.e., are located in the same city (See Table 5 ). Whereas 18.8% of all transactions occur when the distance between target and acquirer is 100km or less, only 3.7% transactions occur in the next 100 km, i.e., when the distance is between 100km and 200km. Approximately, 3% of transactions are added for every 100km for distance categories greater than 100km. This suggests that a 100km radius captures a substantial fraction of the "local bias" observed in acquisitions.
A similar picture emerges when we examine the distribution of acquirer returns by distance categories. The average acquirer return when targets and acquirers have zero distance is 2.68%. Average acquirer returns are somewhat higher for transactions in the next two distance categories, that is when the distance is between zero and 50 km, and when the distance is between 50km and 100km. Average acquirer distance drops by a percentage (about 33%) when the distance is between 100km and 200km and tends to be lower for distance greater than 200km as seen in Figure 1 . Any advantage from geographic proximity captured by the acquirer appears to manifest itself for distances within 100km. We consequently, report all results using 100km to define transactions that are local. 
Multivariate Analysis of Acquirer Returns
The univariate evidence on higher acquirer returns in local transactions does not control for several important variables that affect acquirer returns. First, we control for the mode of payment by including dummies that take the value one when the mode of payment is cash and when it is a combination of cash and stock (hybrid). Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) report that returns to acquirers are higher when the target is a subsidiary or a private firm. We control for the status of the target by including a private dummy (takes the value one when the target is a private firm) and a subsidiary dummy (takes the value one when the target is a subsidiary). We also control for the relative value of the transaction and its interaction with the mode of payment.
To control for same industry deals and possibly higher returns associated with these deals, we include a dummy for deals that are in the same two-digit SIC. Log of total assets in the year prior to the announcement of the transaction is included to control for the size of the acquirer. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) report that only small acquirers earn positive returns in their acquisitions. We include a dummy for small acquirers to control for this effect. The small size dummy takes the value one if the acquirer is in the bottom third by total assets. Lastly, we include the local dummy that takes the value one when the transaction is local, i.e., the target and the acquirer firm are headquartered within 100km of each other.
Controlling for these, the coefficient of the local dummy is positive and significant at the 1% level (See Table 6 ).
3 Local transactions are associated with higher acquirer returns of 95 basis points. This estimate is in line with the higher average return to local acquirers seen in Finally, we separately estimate the model for transactions that involve mergers and acquisition of majority interest (model 3) and those that involve asset acquisitions (model 4).
Acquirers earn significantly higher returns in local transactions irrespective of the type of the transaction, though the return to local acquirers is somewhat higher for asset sales than for mergers in both the estimated magnitude and statistical significance.
V. Information Asymmetries, Synergies and Agency Costs
In this section, we explore the source of these higher returns to acquirers in local transactions that has been documented.
Information Asymmetries
Coval and Moskowitz (2001), Malloy (2003) and Ivkovich and Weisbennar (2003) suggest that the geographic proximity is associated with information advantages. Any information advantage possessed by the acquirer is likely to be more valuable the greater is the information unavailability of the target firm. If the higher return to local acquirers is due to information advantages, then it should be increasing in the severity of the information unavailability of the target. We test for this by using four proxies for the severity of the information problems faced by the target.
First, we use the status of the target to proxy for information availibility. Private firms, unlike public ones, do not disclose financial details, have few outside investors, and do not have analyst coverage. Given the inherently higher information asymmetries with private firms, the information advantage arising from geographic proximity should be higher for private targets than for public targets. Acquirers of public targets earn an insignificant 10 basis more in their local transactions relative to their non-local transactions. In contrast, local acquirers of firms that are not publicly traded earn a highly significant 110 basis points more (See Table 7 ).
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Hansen (1987) and Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990) model the effect of uncertainty with respect to target valuation on the mode of payment. They show that bidders make cash offers when there is uncertainty with respect to their own value and stock offers when there is uncertainty with respect to the target. This suggests that stock is more likely to be used as a mode of payment when there is higher information asymmetry with respect to the target. As seen in Model 2, Table 7 , we find that local acquirers earn an insignificant 40 basis points more when they acquire by cash only and a significant 127 basis points more when they use stock.
A source of information asymmetry that has been pointed by several papers is the location of the firm. Lastly, we use the ratio of firm's expenses on research and development scaled by sales to capture growth opportunities and information asymmetries arising from it. However, since a substantial part of our sample is not publicly traded we do not have data for research and development expenditures at the firm level. We estimate the average ratio of research and development expenses to sales at the two-digit SIC level. Target firms are classified as having low R&D if their industry is in the bottom third of R&D expenditures in the year prior to the announcement of the transaction. The return to local acquirers is not larger for the high R&D group relative to the low R&D group (See Table 7 , Model 4). As there is substantial variation in the R&D expenditures within an industry, our industry level measure captures differences in information asymmetry induced by growth opportunities only partially. This may account for the absence of results obtained using R&D intensity to capture information asymmetries.
In summary, we find that returns to local acquirers are higher when the target faces greater information asymmetry. Local acquirers earn significant positive returns when the target is not publicly traded, when the acquirer uses stock to pay for the acquisitions and when the target resides in a non-metro area. In comparison, local acquirers earn insignificant returns when the target is publicly traded, when the acquirer uses cash to pay for the acquisition and when the target resides in a metro area.
Industry Effects and Synergies
There is significant evidence in prior literature that industries tend to be geographically concentrated. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) show that concentration in industries could arise due to natural cost advantage of regions as well as to industry-specific spillovers. Audretsch and Feldman (1996) , and Audretsch and Stephan (1996) document the existence of industry specific spillovers in economic activities like innovation that depend on new economic knowledge. This causes these industries to be geographically concentrated.
If industries tend to be geographically concentrated, then local deals could be a proxy for transactions within the same industry and the higher return to acquirers in local deals due to the higher synergies associated with same industry transactions. However, we find no evidence that local transactions are predominately in the same industry. About 18.2% of all deals in the same two-digit SIC are local and 18.9% of all deals in different industries are local (see Table 8 ).
Further, we find no evidence that the return to acquirers in local deals is higher when it is in the same industry. On the contrary, acquirer earn on average 67 basis points more in local deals in the same industry while earning 144 basis points more in local deals in different industries. A similar picture emerges with median acquirer returns. After controlling for other determinants of acquirer returns, in a multivariate analysis, we find that local acquirers earn 76 basis points more when the transaction is in the same industry and 110 basis points more when it is in different industries. In summary, there is little evidence that local transactions proxy for same industry transactions or that the higher return in local transaction is due to higher synergies associated with same industry transactions.
However, synergies in local transactions could arise from sources unrelated to being in the same industry. In the presence of these local synergies, the target firm's assets are more valuable to a local acquirer relative to a similar non-local acquirer. This implies that total returns in local transactions should be higher relative to non-local transactions. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) and Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) show that total returns are higher in transactions that create more value. As the synergies are specific to local acquirers, local acquirers are likely to capture most of the higher value created from the redeployment of assets locally. Targets in local transactions may also be able to share some of the gains if they have bargaining power. If local transactions are associated with higher synergies then: a) total returns should be higher, b) acquirer returns should be higher, and c) target returns should be the same or higher in local transactions.
As discussed earlier, higher acquirer returns in local transactions are also consistent with local acquirers having information advantages. However, the implication for target and total returns are different in the presence of local synergies relative to the presence of local information advantages. In the presence of information asymmetries the return to target firms in local transactions should be lower than in non-local transactions. This is because information asymmetry reduces the number of potential bidders and the offer price for the asset does not fully capture the potential gains from employing the asset in its most productive use. If the local informed acquirer is one of several productive users of the asset the total returns in the local transaction should be no different than that of non-local transactions. However, to the extent that local informed acquirers are not the most productive users of the asset, total returns in local transactions should be lower than that in non-local transactions. Therefore, with local information advantages a) acquirer returns should be higher, b) target returns should be lower, and c) total returns should be the same or lower in local transactions.
Examining target returns and total returns in local transactions allows us to test for the source of higher acquirer returns seen in local transactions. Data on target returns and total returns however is available for only public targets. For this subset of transactions, where the target data is available on CRSP, we estimated target returns and total returns. Consistent with the estimation of acquirer returns we calculate [-2,2] day return for the target around the announcement. The abnormal returns are given as where is the daily return on the target firm i and is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index. Total return is weighted average return to acquirers and targets with the weights being the market value of the acquirer and target firms as of calendar year end prior to the announcement of the transaction. A potential problem with using public firms is that there is little evidence that local acquirers earn higher returns in this subsample (See Table 4 ). Lack of higher acquirer returns in local transactions suggests the absence of both local synergies as well as local information advantages. This makes it difficult to examine the importance of synergies relative to information advantages. As seen in the prior section, returns to local acquirers are decreasing in proxies for information asymmetry of the target. We use these proxies of information asymmetry to isolate significant higher returns to local acquirers in this sample of only public targets.
We estimate returns to local acquirers when the target resides in a metro area relative to a non-metro area. Consistent with the evidence in Table7, we find higher returns to local acquirers when the target is in a non-metro area for this subsample of firms. To examine if the higher return in local transactions, we had attributed to information asymmetry, is due to synergies we examine target returns and total returns. Targets in non-metro areas earn 244 basis points lower in local transactions though this is significant only at the 20% level (See table 9, Model 1). Total return in local transactions where targets are in non-metro areas is not significantly different from zero. The higher local acquirer returns are unlikely to be due to local synergies, as there is little evidence of significantly higher total returns and higher target returns. There continues to be no evidence of higher total returns when we use mode of payment to isolate higher local acquirer returns (See Table 9 , Model 2). As there is little evidence of higher total returns in local transactions it is unlikely that the higher local acquirer returns are due to local synergies. However, as this was documented in transactions more likely to be driven by information, the result is suggestive and not conclusive for the absence of local synergies.
Agency Costs
Managers have incentives to grow their firms beyond their optimal size as this increases their power and the resources under their control (Jensen (1986) ). Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) show that returns are significantly lower for bidders with free cash flow and low investment opportunities. If bidders with agency costs are less likely to engage in local transactions, then the higher return to local acquirers could reflect a lower probability of an agency cost motivated acquisition. In this section, we examine whether a low agency cost firm is more likely to undertake local transactions and whether this explains the higher returns observed in local transactions.
We use three proxies to capture potential agency costs in firms. First, we calculate the free cash in the firm (See Jensen (1986) ). Free cash is the cash left after paying for all essential expenses and investment. Free cash was estimated as lagged operating income before depreciation (data13) -interest paid (data 15) -taxes paid (data 16) -changes in deferred taxes (data 74) -capital expenditure (data 128) scaled by beginning of period total assets. Based on the estimated free cash flow, firms are classified as having high agency costs if their free cash is in the top quartile in the sample of acquirers. The second proxy to capture a higher probability of undertaking value destroying acquisitions is firm size. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) document that only small acquirers earn positive returns and the average return to large acquirers is negative. We classify large firms, those with total assets in the year prior to the announcement of the transactions in the top quartile, as being more likely to undertake value-destroying acquisitions. The last proxy is the frequency of acquisitions. Acquirers that make several acquisitions are more likely to be motivated by empire building considerations. We classify firms as frequent acquirers if they undertake more than 15 acquisitions over our sample period of 1990-2003. Frequent acquirers account for approximately 17% of the transactions in our sample.
All three proxies are significantly correlated with lower bidder returns (See Table 10) Acquirers classified as having low agency costs earn significantly higher returns in both mergers and acquisitions of majority interest, as well as, in asset acquisitions. We find that acquirers with high agency costs make fewer local transactions. Acquirers with large free cash acquire locally in 17.6% of deals while acquirers with low free cash flow acquire locally in 18.4% of the deals.
Large acquirers acquire locally in 16% of the deals while small acquirers acquire locally in 18.8% of the cases. Frequent acquirers acquire locally in only 14.2% of the deals in contrast to 19.3% local transactions for less frequent acquirers.
As high agency cost acquirers are associated with lower returns and undertake fewer local transactions, this might explain the higher returns documented for local transactions. When proxies of agency costs are included in the OLS regressions, the coefficient of local transactions continues to be positive and significant. For merger transactions, estimates of higher acquirer returns in local transaction, controlling for agency problems, range from 88 basis points to 92 basis points with different proxies of agency costs. These higher returns in local transactions are significant at the 5% level. For assets acquisitions, estimates of higher acquirer returns in local transactions, controlling for agency problems, range from 100 to 105 basis points and are significant at the 1% level. These results have not been displayed in tables for brevity. The higher return to local acquirers is not explained away by the lower propensity with which high agency cost acquirers undertake local transactions.
Since high agency costs acquirers are motivated to undertake acquisitions for reasons other than value maximization, they are less likely to engage in acquisitions to exploit information advantages or synergies. If the higher return in local transactions is due to information advantages or synergies, then the local deals of high agency cost firms should be associated with smaller or no positive returns. This is because these local transactions are unlikely to be motivated by information advantages or synergies. To examine this we separately estimate the return to local transactions for high agency cost and low agency cost acquirers.
When free cash is used to proxy for agency costs, we find that low agency cost acquirers earn 101 basis points in local deals (significant at the 1% level) relative to an insignificant 70 basis point for high agency cost acquirer. With firm size as a proxy, we find low agency cost acquirers earn 111 basis points in their local transactions (significant at the 1% level) relative to an insignificant negative one basis point for high agency cost acquirers (see Table 11 ). Similarly, less frequent acquirers earn a significant 112 basis points in local deals relative to a loss of 11 basis points for frequent acquirers. These results are not a function of the type of transactions and hold for both mergers and acquisitions of majority interest as well as for asset acquisitions.
With all three proxies we find higher return in local transactions for low agency cost acquirers relative to insignificant returns in local deals of high agency cost acquirers. This supports the presence of local information advantages or local synergies as the source of the higher local acquirer returns.
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) document that mutual funds in non-metro areas are more likely to exploit the information advantages arising from geographic proximity. Malloy (2004) also finds that analysts in non-metro areas are more likely to use local information advantages.
We examine whether a similar effect is observed in firm's investment decisions. All acquirers headquartered within 50km of the 20 largest cities are classified as metro acquirers and others as non-metro acquirers. We find that metro acquirers earn an insignificant 75 basis points in local transactions. In comparison, non-metro acquirers earn a significant (at the 1% level) return of 106 basis points in local transactions.
In summary, we find no evidence that the somewhat higher probability of local deals being initiated by low agency cost acquirers explains the higher returns in local deals. We also find little evidence that the higher average return to acquirers in local transactions is due to higher synergies in local deals. Returns to acquirers in local deals are increasing in the proxies of information asymmetry of target firms. Further, the higher return to acquirers in local transactions is seen only for acquirers more likely to exploit local information advantages or local synergies. This suggests that geographic proximity is associated with significant economic gains to acquiring firms, which are likely to be arising from information advantages.
VIII. Conclusion
We find evidence of "local bias" in the acquisition decisions of U.S public firms over the period 1990-2003. Target firms are acquired by public firms headquartered within 100km in 18.8% of the transactions, even though an average target firm has only 6.2% of public firms headquartered locally that operate within the same industry. We also find that acquirers earn significantly higher returns in their local transactions relative to their non-local transactions. The return in local transactions is on average 56% higher than that in non-local transactions.
We examine the sources of these higher local acquirer returns. There is little evidence that higher local acquirer returns are due to higher local synergies. There is also little evidence that the higher acquirer returns are due to a higher probability that local transactions are initiated by low agency cost acquirers. Lastly, we examine whether the higher local acquirer returns arise from potential information advantages arising from geographic proximity. In support of this, we find that the higher return in local transactions is increasing in proxies for information asymmetry of the target. The returns are higher when the target is not publicly traded, when stock is used to pay for the acquisition, and when the target is located in a non-metro area.
The evidence is consistent with the existence of information asymmetries in the market for assets and with geographic proximity mitigating these information problems. The findings in the paper support prior findings on the role of distance in resolution of information asymmetries.
The presence of information asymmetries in the acquisition market implies lack of competitive bidding for targets that ensures efficient allocation of assets in the economy. The evidence in the paper highlights the importance of further research that throws light on the precise nature of the information advantages that arise from geographic proximity.
Table 1 Data Characteristics over time
The first column displays the percentage of all transactions during the year that were characterized as mergers or acquisition of majority interest. The remaining transactions primarily involved acquisition of assets. Columns 3-5 display the percentage of transactions during the year where the target firm was a private, public and subsidiary respectively. 
Table 2 Summary Statistics for the Data
Deal value is expressed in millions of dollars. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value and the market value of the acquirer in the year prior to the announcement of the deal. Size of the acquirer is the value of total assets, in millions of dollars, at the end of the year prior to the announcement of the deal. Market value of the acquirer, in millions of dollars, is the market value at the end of the year prior to the announcement of the deal. Acquirer and target firms are classified as being in the same industry if they belong to the same two digit SIC. Mode of payment is classified as cash if the payment consisted of cash, debt, liabilities or some combination of these. Mode of payment was classified as stock if the payment consisted of stock, warrants, options or some combination of these. All other model of payments were classified as hybrids.
Mean 
Table 3 Extent of Local Bias
Transactions are classified as local if the distance between the headquarters of acquiring and target firms is less than 100km. The table presents the average probability of being acquired locally by quintiles of firms ranked by the probability of being acquired locally. In Panel A, the probability of being acquired locally is estimated as the fraction of all public firms that reside locally. In Panel B, the probability of being acquired locally is estimated as the fraction of firms in the two digit SIC of the target that reside locally. Finally, in Panel C, the probability of being acquired locally is estimated as the fraction of public firms in the two digit SIC of the target and acquirer that reside locally. The second column in all panels is the fraction of targets in the group that were locally acquired.
Panel 
Table 4 Acquirer Returns for Local and Non-Local Deals
The table displays average acquirer returns over [-2,2] day around announcement for local and non-local transactions. Transactions are classified as local if the target and acquirer are located within 100km of each other. Difference in mean returns is the difference in the average return to acquirers in local transactions and non-local transactions for the category. *,**,*** refer to significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Mean Acquirer Returns
Median Acquirer Returns 
Table 5 Distribution of Transactions and Returns by Distance
Mean acquirer returns is the average return to acquirers for all transactions where the distance between the acquirer and the target was estimated to lie in the distance range. The last column displays the fraction of transactions that lie in the particular distance category. The distance range 0 includes transactions where the acquirer and target were in the same city. The category 0-50km includes all transactions where the distance between acquirer and target was greater than zero but less than or equal to 50km. The remaining categories are similarly defined.
Distance Range
Table 6 OLS Regressions for Acquirer Returns
The dependent variable is the [-2,2] day acquirer returns around announcement. Mode of payment is classified as cash if the payment consisted of cash, debt, liabilities or some combination of these. Mode of payment was classified as stock if the payment consisted of stock, warrants, options or some combination of these. All other model of payments were classified as hybrids. Relative value is the ratio of the value of the transaction to the market value of the acquirer at the end of the year prior to the announcement. Acquirers and targets were classified in the same industry if they belonged to the same two digit SIC code. Small size dummy takes the value one if acquirers assets are in the bottom third for the sample. Transactions were classified as local if the acquirer and target were within 100km of each other. Model 3 includes transactions that involved mergers and acquisition of majority interest. Model 4 includes transactions involving asset acquisitions. The errors are corrected for event clustering. P values are reported in parenthesis below. *,**, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Table 7 Acquirer Returns in Local Transactions by Information Asymmetries
The dependent variable is the [-2,2] day acquirer return around announcement. Mode of payment is cash if payment is in cash, debt, or liabilities. It is stock if payment is in stock, warrants, or options. All other payments are hybrids. Relative value is the ratio of value of the deal to market value of the acquirer. Same Industry dummy is one if acquirers and targets are in the same two-digit SIC code. Small size dummy takes the value one if the acquirer's assets are in the bottom third. Local dummy is one if the acquirer and target are located within 100km. Acquirer size is the log of the total assets in year prior. Public (Non-Public) dummy is one if target is a public (private or subsidiary) firm. Cash (Non-Cash) dummy is one if the mode of payment is cash (stock or hybrid). Metro (Non Metro) dummy is one if the target is located within (outside) 50km of the largest cities. Low R&D (High R&D) dummy is one if the target firm's industry is in the bottom third (top two third) ranked by the industry ratio of R&D expenses to sales. The errors were corrected for clustering of events. P values are reported in parenthesis below. *,**, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Model 1 Transactions are classified as being in the same (different) industry if the target and the acquirer are in the same (different) two-digit SIC code. Local (Non-Local) transactions are those where the target and acquirer are located within (more than) 100km of each other. The multivariate analysis included a constant, dummy for targets that are non publicly traded, dummy when cash is used as a mode of payment, dummy when both cash and stock are used as a mode of payment, ratio of the value of the transaction to the market value of the acquirer (relative value), interaction of relative value with the mode of payment, log of total assets of the acquirer, and dummy when total assets of the acquirer are in the bottom third. The errors in the multivariate analysis are corrected for event clustering. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Same

Table 9 Total Returns and Target Returns for Public Targets
Acquirer (target) return is the [-2,2] day acquirer (target) return around announcement of the transaction. Total returns are the weighted average return for acquirers and target. Mode of payment is cash if payment is in cash, debt, or liabilities. It is stock if payment is in stock, warrants, or options. All other payments are hybrids. Relative value is the ratio of value of the deal to market value of the acquirer. Same Industry dummy is one if acquirers and targets are in the same two-digit SIC code. Small size dummy takes the value one if the acquirer's assets are in the bottom third. Local dummy is one if the acquirer and target are located within 100km. Acquirer and target size is the log of the total assets in year prior. Metro (Non Metro) dummy is one if the target is located within (outside) 50km of the largest cities. The errors were corrected for clustering of events. P values are reported in parenthesis below. *,**, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Model 1
Model 2 
Table 10 Proxies of Agency Cost, Returns and Propensity for Local Deals
The table displays average acquirer returns which are [-2,2] day return around announcement. Free cash flow is is the cash left after paying for all essential expenses and investment scaled by total assets. Acquirers with free cash flow in the top quartile are classified as having high free cash flow. The rest are classified as low free cash flow. Acquirers with total assets in the top quartile are classified as large size and the rest as low size. Frequent acquirers are those that make more than 15 acquisitions over [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . P values are reported in parenthesis below. *,**, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Mergers
Table 11 Acquirer Returns in Local Transactions by Acquirer Agency Costs
The dependent variable is the [-2,2] day acquirer return around announcement. Mode of payment is cash if payment is in cash, debt, or liabilities. It is stock if payment is in stock, warrants, or options. All other payments are hybrids. Relative value is the ratio of value of the deal to market value of the acquirer. Same Industry dummy is one if acquirers and targets are in the same two-digit SIC code. Small size dummy takes the value one if the acquirer's assets are in the bottom third. Local dummy is one if the acquirer and target are located within 100km. Free cash flow is is the cash left after paying for all essential expenses and investment scaled by total assets. Acquirers with free cash flow in the top quartile are classified as having high free cash flow. The rest are classified as low free cash flow. Acquirers with total assets in the top quartile are classified as large size and the rest as low size. Frequent acquirers are those that make more than 15 acquisitions over 1990-2002. Acquirer Metro is a dummy that is one if the acquirer is within 50km of the 20 largest cities. The errors were corrected for clustering of events. A constant was included but has not been displayed. P values are reported in parenthesis below. *,**, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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